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INTRODUCTION:   This Policy Brief shows 
how government actions can affect the 
performance of the maize marketing system and 
influence the severity of food crises.  Examples 
from the 2005/06 marketing season are used to 
illustrate how Zambia’s food security situation 
can be improved through closer consultation, 
transparency and predictability between 
government and the private sector.  The Policy 
Synthesis also identifies longer-run options for 
strengthening the ability of local and regional 
markets to ensure household and national food 
security in the face of maize production 
instability.  Our analysis is based on interviews 
with representatives of the Maize Millers 
Association of Zambia (MAZ), the Grain 
Traders Association (GTA), the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives (MACO), the 
Food Reserve Agency (FRA), as well as small- 

















Main policy messages for the 2005/06 marketing season: 
•  Domestic production of maize was inadequate this season; imports are required.   
•  Yet mixed signals and disincentives have resulted in delays and insufficient quantities 
of commercial imports, as of December 2005, by both the private sector and FRA.   
•  Consumers will pay a high price for these delays, as import prices have risen over $100 
per ton between July and December.   
•  Immediate action can facilitate private imports and reduce pressure on consumer prices: 
-  make extension of the maize import and import duty waiver period to 31
st 
March 2006 applicable to all importers, including small traders 
-  expedite maize import clearance; 
-  clarify FRA’s intended import volume, period of sale, and selling price to 
reduce uncertainty for private traders and millers 
-  publicize FRA willingness to sell maize grain in small lots to consumers and 
small traders so that mugaiwa maize meal remains a viable option for low 
income rural and urban consumers. 
 
UNANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES OF 
GOVERNMENT DECISIONS:  WHAT 
HAPPENED IN 2005?  A chronology of 
decisions and their effects on the maize market 
is summarized in Table 1.  A key feature of this 
chronology is mixed signals sent to the maize 
market resulting in disincentives to import even 
though imports are clearly needed at this time.  
 
MARKET PARALYSIS DUE TO 
UNCERTAINTY AND RELATED 
DELAYS:  The uncertainty and unpredictability 
of how the import duty issue was handled 
caused a paralysis of the import market, 
whereby importers did not make firm import 
commitments until the import duty was waived.  
This was a rational response by private traders, 
since importing before the duty was waived 
would have forced them to pay at least $30 per 
ton more than competing firms who waited 
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Date  Action/No Action  Implications/Comments 
January  •  Government raises maize import duty from 5% to 15%   Raises the price at which importation 
becomes attractive, adversely affecting 
consumers in a shortfall year 
May  •  National Food Balance Sheet presented to government 
showing an import requirement of  85,000 tonnes 
•  Millers, traders, and donors estimate that the commercial 
import requirement is instead 150,000 tonnes 
To what extent is the National FBS able to 
accurately determine import requirements? 
June  •  Private sector requests lifting of the 15% import duty 
•  Government refuses  
CIF import price from South Africa is at US 
$210 per tonne 
August 12  •  Millers agree that 186,000 imports required 
•  Millers request import permits from MACO and duty waiver 
from MFNP 
CIF import price increases to $236 per 
tonne 
August 26  •  MACO announces lifting of import ban and that it will issue 
import permits for 150,000 tons millers and 50,000 tons to 
FRA 
•  Ministry of Finance and National Planning still refuses to 
waive the import duty  
Private sector continue to lobby 
government on waiving of duty  
September 13  •  After heavy lobbying by all the stakeholders, MFNP agrees to 
waive duty 
No imports yet as permits not yet issued 
September 26  •  MACO issues permits 
•  Millers begin to contract for imports  
CIF price $256/ton 
October and 
November 
•  FRA releases 50,000 tons of locally procured maize through 
tender at $210/ton (CIF import price stands at $266-287);  
FRA’s selling of maize substantially below 
import price causes many millers to opt for 
cheaper FRA maize instead of importing  
November 8  •  MACO advised private sector to stop importing because they 
are failing to comply with new phytosanitary regulations 
 
Imports further slowed 
November  
15-18 
•  Millers finance trip to South Africa for Mt. Makulu 
phytosanitary unit Inspector to confirm that 8 new pests are 
not present in regions where traders are arranging exports to 
Zambia    
“Wait and see” approach taken by private 
sector as they await the outcome of the 
inspection  
November 21  •  President Mwanawasa declares a national disaster at the 
request of Parliament. 
 
November 23:  •  Mt. Makulu issues phytosanitary clearance; permits imports to 
resume 
Thirteen days lost; CIF price from South 
Africa rises to $278 per tonne 
December 3  
 
•  President Mwanawasa announces that millers should lower 
maize prices significantly due to the abrupt strengthening of 
the Kwacha (up 26% in two weeks) 
Traders and millers who have already paid 
up contracts at the old exchange rate 
stand to lose 26% on their imports  
December 7  •  Stakeholders meet with MACO to discuss the maize situation 
 
Exchange rate reduces Kwacha price of 
imports; but rising grain prices and 
transport costs combine to offset these 
gains 
December 19  •  Importation period extended to 31
st March, 2006 
•  MACO writes to Ministry of Finance and National Planning  to 
extend the import duty waiver 
Potential for the uncertainty over the 
extension of the waiver to constrain 
imports (CIF price from South Africa rises 
to $320/tonne 
December 28  •  Import duty waiver extended to 31




to import until after the duty was waived.  The 
delay in waiving the duty also pushed imports 
into a period when South African prices were 
higher than earlier in the season.  Moreover, 
because of increased demand for transport 
services in the region, current transport rates are 
higher and transport delays more severe than 
they were earlier in the season.  Further delays 
are likely to occur at the major border crossings 
once large numbers of trucks start rolling in, 
adding to the already overstretched capacity of 
Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) and Customs.  
Random testing for phytosanitary requirements 
may also add to these delays, even though 
management of Mount Makulu indicated that 
testing is not time consuming and should not 
cause additional delays.  
 
IMPACTS OF MARKET PARALYSIS:  The 
consequence of the above situation was that, as 
of  December 16, 2005, the private sector had 
imported only 40,000 tonnes of maize, and FRA 
has yet to import any maize.  The combined 
effect of the delayed import duty waiver, 
phytosanitary certification issues, and resulting 
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delayed by up to four months.  At the same time, 
significant maize exports, estimated to be as 
much as 500 tonnes per day, continue from the 
Copperbelt to DRC.  Of the 40,000 tonnes 
imported so far from South Africa, only 5,000 
tonnes had arrived in Zambia by November 8.  
Another 17,000 tonnes arrived between 
November 8 and December 6, and another 
18,000 tonnes arrived between December 7-16, 
2005 (MAZ).  While data are not available on 
informal maize imports, stakeholder interviews 
indicate that maize has been moving into 
Zambia from Tanzania.  These informal flows 
may turn out to be a great help to Zambian 
consumers in the months to come. 
 
The accelerated import flows from November 8 
show that when market impediments are dealt 
with and there is reasonable policy certainty in 
the market, then the private sector can respond 
effectively.  This is an example of how 
predictable government behaviour can trigger 
effective private sector response.  The 
accelerated imports seen in the last two weeks 
seem to emanate from the conclusion of the 
consultative meeting the Minister of Agriculture 
and Cooperative had with industry stakeholders 
on December 7, 2005. 
 
LOCAL AND IMPORT MAIZE GRAIN 
PARITY PRICE TRENDS:  From January to 
December, 2005, the local maize price has 
persistently remained below import parity but 
had swiftly been moving towards convergence 
by December, showing an import-driven market 
(Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1.  Local and Import Prices for white maize  
(US Dollar per kilogram in 2005) 
 
 
The FRA price has not only been below the 
import parity price but also below the local 
market price.  This explains the preference of 
millers to buy local maize instead of importing 
maize and the slow pace of imports despite the 
duty waiver and the resolving of the SPS issues.  
The frequency of local prices hitting import 
parity (Figure 2) should not be surprising as it is 
The FRA price has not only been below the 
import parity price but also below the local  
The FRA price has not only been below the 
import parity price but also below the local 
market price.  This explains the preference of 
millers to buy local maize instead of importing 
maize and the slow pace of imports despite the 
duty waiver and the resolving of the SPS issues.  
The frequency of local prices hitting import 
parity (Figure 2) should not be surprising as it is 
concomitant with the apparently ever more 
frequent food deficits in Zambia. 
 
Figure 2.  Domestic Maize Prices Reaching Import 
Parity More Frequently 
Source:  Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, 
Government of Zambia,  and transport cost data from 
local transporters. 
 
There are various sources of changes in maize 
import prices.   First, there are the seasonal 
characteristics of the commodity exchange, 
South African Exchange (SAFEX), which 
generally occur each year.   In recent months, 
increased transport costs from South Africa have 
increased due to increased demand by not only 
Zambia, but other market participants such as 
Zimbabwe and Malawi.  
 
The South African Rand strengthened against 
the United States Dollar in recent weeks, placing 
further upward pressure on dollar-based import 
prices.  An estimated reduction of maize 
plantings in South Africa for 2005/2006 is 
further contributing to higher maize prices on 
SAFEX (AMT 2005).  Figure 3 breaks down the 
change in maize import prices into the sources 
of changes, whether from SAFEX price changes 
or transport costs.  Mitigating these price rises is 
a strengthening of the Zambian Kwacha with 
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While the strengthening of the Kwacha has 
reduced the kwacha cost of importing maize, the 
combined effect of higher SAFEX price and 
increased transport costs has offset the exchange 
rate gains.  
 
Transport is very difficult to book into Zambia 
from South Africa.   Transport rates have nearly 
doubled, from $80/ton early in the season to 
US$150 by December, 2005. The increase in 
transport costs together with the increasing 
SAFEX price and have pushed the CIF price to 
more than US$320 in December from $230 in 
July, 2005.  The increased buying of maize by 
the World Food Programme (WFP) may also be 
a contributing factor to the increase in CIF price.  
Some grain traders, such as AFGRI, are quoting 
their prices for local delivery of imported maize 
in the range of US$320 to US$350 per metric 
tonne.  
  
Local maize prices have risen to between 
US$290-365 per ton (CHC Commodities 
Market Report).  The increase is consistent with 
rising prices on SAFEX and equally important is 
driven by the demand from industrial users who 
are unable to procure sufficient rations of cheap 
FRA maize. More than anything, the rising 
prices in Zambia reflect the constraints 
impeding the flow of maize importation.  
 
IMPACT OF NEW PHYTO-SANITARY 
CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS:  New 
phytosanitary regulations increasing the number 
of pests and diseases to be checked were 
introduced in 2004, but they were not operative 
last season because Zambia did not import 
maize during the 2004/05 marketing year.  The 
legislation mandates that the newly added 
pathogens require testing while the crop is still 
in the field.  But this testing was not carried out 
in 2005 because neither the South African 
authorities nor prospective maize buyers and 
sellers were aware of the prior change in 
legislation until they initiated maize importation 
in November, 2005.  A modified procedure to 
check for these pathogens while maize is in 
storage was however developed and 
implemented.  Recent findings suggested that 
the additional pathogens do not exist in South 
Africa and certification is now taking place as 
usual.  However, the fact that the private sector 
was largely unaware of the new requirements 
slowed down imports by close to two weeks.   
 
FRA MAIZE SALES PROCEDURES AND 
ACCESS BY SMALL TRADERS AND 
HAMMERMILLERS:  At the request of large 
millers and in an effort to reduce mealie meal 
prices to consumers, the Food Reserve Agency 
(FRA) is selling 110,000 tonnes of maize from 
November 2005 to March, 2006 as summarized 
in Table 2.   
 
 
Table 2. Food Reserve Agency Maize Sales (Intentions) 
to Registered Millers 
 
Month  Year  Quantity, 
Tonnes 
November/December 2005 35,000 
January 2006  25,000 
February 2006  25,000 
March 2006  25,000 
   110,000 
Source:  Food Reserve Agency 
 
These stocks are sold by tender to millers only.  
With few millers that meet the tendering 
requirements the established sales price tends to 
be below market price. Being awarded a tender 
is highly lucrative  because FRA is selling the 
maize at US$210  per tonne,  while the  landed  
cost of maize imports from South Africa are in 
the range of $350 per tonne.  Millers who can 
acquire maize from FRA are given a great 
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either get small allocations or cannot source 
maize from FRA at all.
1  It is also possible that 
selling maize at subsidized prices to millers 
benefits the millers more so than consumers.   
Moreover, by selling maize at subsidized prices, 
the FRA may provide yet another disincentive to 
traders to import maize, because they are vying 
to sell to the same millers being supplied by the 
FRA at a substantially lower price. 
 
The FRA’s pan-territorial prices also 
disadvantage traders who must pay the full 
transport cost of buying grain in rural areas and 
selling in urban areas.  By adopting a uniform 
and subsidized selling price, the FRA is 
undercutting private traders and encouraging 
them to do the opposite of what the government 
would want the private sector to do – buy maize 
in rural areas and make it available to millers 
and consumers in urban areas where it is 
needed.  
 
There is need to ensure that FRA releases 
adequate supplies onto local markets, so that 
small millers, small traders and consumers can 
continue to acquire grain to mill into mugaiwa.  
Consumer surveys in Zambia show that most of 
the urban poor rely primarily on informal traders 
and small millers for their maize meal and could 
reduce their expenditure on maize by 20% by 
purchasing grain and milling it into mugaiwa at 
a neighborhood small mill as opposed to 
purchasing packaged breakfast meal in a store 
(Mwiinga et al. 2003).  From our Rapid 
Appraisal in late October, we estimated the 
market shares of mugaiwa to be as much as 50% 
of urban maize meal consumption in the May-
August period (Zulu et al. forthcoming), but it 
dwindles down to almost nothing if grain 
becomes unavailable in local markets.  
 
Based on surveys of 42 hammermillers 
conducted in November and December 2005 in 
Lusaka and Copperbelt Provinces, the FSRP 
found that each mill averaged 36 tonnes of 
maize throughput per month in June-July, but 
this has dwindled to 12 tonnes per month by 
December.  Only two of the 42 millers surveyed 
                                                           
1 FRA management stated that it would like to sell maize at cost, 
but is being directed to sell at US$210 per tonne.   
were selling mealie meal through the entire 
season so far.  One miller buys from traders and 
the other miller grows maize on a large family 
farm and supplies it to his grain mill, so he is 
able to continue selling in spite of maize having 
become very scarce in local markets.  Of the 42 
millers interviewed, 21 say there is no maize to 
be bought in their local market, 14 say supplies 
are available but extremely scarce, and only 7 
say they can buy maize in their local markets.  If 
urban consumers become unable to purchase 
maize grain in local markets, they will become 
dependent on purchasing higher-priced 
commercial meal and this will further jeopardize 
their ability to afford adequate food in this year 
of already very high food prices.  
 
Small traders and millers play an integral role in 
ensuring competition in the grain milling 
industry in Zambia.  Government practices that 
foster their ability to thrive would both 
encourage greater competition in the grain 
marketing system and help poor urban 
consumers.  Unfortunately, despite the fact that 
FRA apparently stands ready to sell maize on a 
“one bag-one bag” basis to small traders and 
millers, none of the 42 hammermillers have 
purchased any maize from FRA (Zulu et al. 
forthcoming).  When asked why not, the 
hammermillers stated that they either don’t 
know what FRA is, or have no capital to buy 
from FRA.  One miller stated his belief that the 
minimum buy quantity is one tonne (20 bags) 
and that most small millers lack the financing to 
purchase such volumes.   
 
FRA IMPORTS:  The Food Reserve Agency, 
through the National Tender Board, has issued a 
tender for the importation of 50,000 tonnes of 
maize.  However, delays at the National Tender 
Board have caused the potential suppliers to 
need to re-submit their bids to adjust to the price 
changes on SAFEX that have occurred in the 
meantime.  Care will need to be taken in 
determining how to allocate this FRA maize and 
at what price to sell it, in a way that is perceived 
to be fair and doesn’t disadvantage traders 
seeking to import commercially.  If traders and 
millers who have taken the initiative to import 
commercially turn out to lose money as a result 
of FRA’s selling maize more cheaply to 
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message that importing maize into Zambia in 
times of production shortfalls is too risky and 
uncertain to warrant further investment and 
would increase the probability that the 
government would need to step in more actively 
in future drought years.  This, of course, is 
contrary to objectives of the strengthening of 
grain markets and regional trade, well 
articulated in the Agricultural Market 
Development Plan (AMDP).  
 
CHOCKED TRANSPORT SYSTEM AND 
IMPLICATIONS:  Whilst the importers 
(including WFP), who were ready to import 
maize from South Africa to Zambia in early 
November, 2005, are now able to continue their 
operations, unfortunately, the scarce rail and 
road transport that was booked earlier had to be 
postponed at a substantial cost and with delayed 
availability.  Transport is becoming extremely 
scarce and costly in the region, due to large 
volumes of maize shipped to Zimbabwe and 
Malawi from South Africa. Consequently, 
transport costs have now increased to US$150 
per tonne, up from US$80 per tonne in the past 
several years (MAZ). 
 
THE TANZANIAN ALTERNATIVE:  
Southern Tanzania enjoyed a relatively good 
maize harvest in 2005.  Representatives from the 
maize industry estimate that 40,000 to 60,000 
tonnes of maize has been imported from 
Tanzania into Zambia by small traders. It is 
likely that the maize imports from Tanzania 
were stimulated by the high FRA buying price 
of ZK36,000 per 50 kg bag (roughly US$160 
per tonne).  However, the full benefits of this 
trade were not captured especially by the 
informal traders because of a discriminatory 
duty waiver system.  The duty waiver is 
provided only to millers and traders with import 
licenses.  Small traders not able to acquire 
import licenses were paying ZK7,500 per 100 
kilogramme bag (roughly US$15 per tonne).  As 
these traders are the main source of maize for 
the small millers and hammermillers the 
effective duty is likely to have been passed on to 
low-income consumers in form of higher maize 
prices.  Thus not only did the duty constrain 
imports in a production shortfall year, it also is 
likely to have raised the cost of maize grain for 
poor consumers.  
 
IMMEDIATE ACTION THAT WOULD 
FACILITATE PRIVATE SECTOR 
IMPORT.   
   
• Application to all sizes of importers the 
extension on maize import and duty 
waivers already agreed through March 
31, 2006:  Extension of the maize import 
and duty waivers should apply to all 
importers of maize, not simply registered 
marketing agents.  This would help 
especially informal traders and low-income 
consumers access maize.  
 
• Exploration of possible fast-tracking of 
maize imports:  Border checks based on 
pre-shipment verification documents could 
continue to accelerate imports as would 
suspension of Regular Customs and ZRA 
administrations.  In addition, Government 
could, on a bilateral basis, engage both 
South Africa and Zimbabwe to facilitate 
flow of maize through Beitbridge.  In 
addition, the Government could ask the 
Republic of South Africa to temporarily 
provide more rail wagons to the Railway 
Systems of Zambia.  
 
• Isssuance of a clear statement regarding 
FRA’s import arrangements, overall sales 
and pricing modalities:  To ensure 
adequate maize supplies, FRA’s 
participation in the market needs to 
encourage rather than discourage 
complementary private sector imports.  It 
will be important for FRA to announce its 
import intentions and sales (especially 
pricing) modalities immediately.  The import 
quantities announced by FRA will need to 
be based on realistic projections of available 
resources and transport capacity. The 
announcement of exaggerated intentions will 
result in private sector holding back and a 
possible supply vacuum.  Mixed signals and 
continued uncertainty will result in reduced 
commercial imports and will cause urban 
food shortages. If pricing modalities allow 
for subsidized sales, this will provide a 
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commercial importation of maize. 
 
• Finding the means to import the 50,000 
tonnes designated for import by the FRA, 
or identification of alternate means to 
obtain these supplies:  The uncertainty 
surrounding these importation modalities is 
adversely affecting potential private sector 
imports.  Further delays may have a negative 
spillover effect on next year’s crop. 
  
• Publicizing more widely that the FRA has 
grain stocks and is willing to sell maize on 
a one-bag/one-bag basis to all buyers:   
Consumers’ access to maize grain for 
purposes of milling it into mugaiwa for the 
remainder of this season is likely to require 
active selling of maize by the FRA to small-
scale buyers who supply local markets such 
as Soweto Market in Lusaka.  If the FRA 
opens selling stations near the main markets 
and sells on a cash basis with the minimum 
amount being one bag, this could make a 
huge contribution to urban food security in 
the next several months.   
 
• Transparent, predictable, and con-sultative 
operations by Government in the maize 
market:  The guiding principle is that there 
should be transparency and predictable 
behaviour by government in its rules of 
engagement in the grain market.  Greater 
consultation, transparency, and predictability 
will reduce the risks facing private maize 
importers.  This can also help strengthen 
mutual trust and facilitate coordination 
between the private and public decisions in 
the market. Government decisions through 
the FRA should be consistent with its 
resources.  For example, if the FRA 
announces its intention to import 200,000 
tonnes but is given the foreign exchange to 
only import 100,000 tonnes, this could lead 
to a food shortage later in the year if the 
private sector based its own import decisions 
on the stated FRA import figure.  
 
• Millers also need to be transparent: Lack of 
transparency amongst millers leads 
government to act out of fear.  Mutual 
consultation, coordination, and trust can be 
nurtured by holding frequent stakeholder 
meetings so that the private sector can also 
provide information and clarify intentions in 
the market.   
 
WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE IN THE 
MEDIUM TO LONG-TERM? Longer-run 
issues need to be dealt with over time to enable 
Zambia to deal more effectively with future 
food crises: 
 
Support diversification of staple food 
consumption patterns:  The food security 
situation in the region is being helped by 
increased diversification of staple food 
consumption in the country.  The increasing role 
of cassava, a drought tolerant crop that can be 
stored in the ground, provides new potential to 
stabilize food consumption in the face of maize 
production shortfalls.  Its potential substitution 
for maize in livestock feeds and brewing offer 
the potential to reduce maize import 
requirements.  The availability of a drought-
tolerant crop that is less prone than maize to 
extreme production fluctuations provides some 
relief in the degree to which maize supplies can 
fluctuate from year to year without seriously 
aggravating food insecurity.  
 
Support private sector supply chains for 
alternative crops:  Government can promote 
more stable farm revenue and consumption 
patterns through supporting private systems of 
input delivery, finance, and commodity 
marketing for a range of crops that can offer 
profitable returns to small farmers.  Such 
investments would represent a shift from the 
strategy of price stabilization and price support 
for a dominant staple grain to a portfolio 
approach that puts greater emphasis on a range 
of higher-valued commodities.  This approach 
would shift the emphasis from direct approaches 
to stabilize and/or support the price for a 
dominant staple grain to one of minimizing the 
impact of food price instability by making the 
socio-political economy less vulnerable to the 
effects of food price instability.  
 
Public goods investments:  Many agricultural 
market failure problems in Africa reflect an 
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drive down the costs of production, marketing 
and contracting.  Preventing market failure is 
likely to require increased commitment to 
investing in public goods (e.g., road, rail and 
port infrastructure, R&D, agricultural extension 
systems, market information systems) and 
institutional change to promote the functioning 
of market-oriented trading systems.   
Unfortunately the large share of government 
expenditures devoted to food and input 
marketing operations means that these funds 
cannot be invested in public goods to promote 
the functioning of viable food markets.  The 
current pressure on the regional transport system 
has exposed capacity issues that need 
addressing. The regional transport capacity 
needs to be enhanced.  
 
Policy clarity:  The future role of the FRA 
needs to be clearly spelt out.  The vision in the 
MTEF with regards to commercializing the FRA 
by 2008 needs to be further articulated and 
harmonized with the vision as laid out in the 
AMDP.  
 
Reconsider import duties on maize for 
unregistered traders:  Government should 
encourage rather than tax informal flows such as 
those from Tanzania or to DRC.  Such trade 
flows represent comparative advantage and can 
help to integrate the region and thus make it less 
vulnerable to trade disruptions. By maintaining 
its open border policy on maize trade, 
Mozambique has shown positive effects on both 
farmers and consumers (Mwanaumo et al 2005). 
Simplifying licensing and border procedures, 
especially for small traders and facilitating flow 
of market information are key to fully realizing 
the benefits of such open trade policy.   
Information on such trade should be captured 
and provided to market players to prevent 
information asymmetries.  The industry does not 
seem to have good market information and 
contacts to effectively access these markets.   
Government can collect and disseminate such 
information as part of its market development 
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